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Birth and Death:
Doctor Control vs. Patient Choice
Sylvia A. Law*
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected several termi-
nally ill patients' claims that criminal prohibitions against physi-
dan-assisted death violate the Constitution; however, five of the
Justices asserted that terminally ill patients have a right to ade-
quate pain medication.! Nonetheless, a significant portion of dy-
ing patients suffer from severe untreated, but treatable, pain.2
* Elizabeth K Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine and Psychiatry, New
York University School of Law. BAL, Antioch College; J.D., New York Uni-
versity. I am grateful for the help and insight of the following people: Jessica
Tsai, NYU Law 1999, my research assistant; Leslie Jenkins, my assistant; and
Elizabeth Evans, NYU Law Librarian. They tracked down materials and
provided editorial and logistical help. Kathryn L. Tucker, lawyer for the
plaintiffs in the right to physician-assisted death cases, Dr. David Orentlicher,
and my son, Benjamin Ensminger-Law, provided support and helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Several concurring
opinions were filed in this case. Justice O'Connor asserted, "There is no dis-
pute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative
care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths." Id. at 2303 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Justice Souter observed that the law "permits physicians to
administer medication to patients in terminal conditions when the primary
intent is to alleviate pain, even when the medication is so powerful as to has-
ten death and the patient chooses to receive it with that understanding." Id.
at 2289 (Souter, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Breyer asserted, "the laws
of New York and Washington do not prohibit doctors from providing patients
with drugs sufient to control pain despite the risk that those drugs themselves
will kill" Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens observed,
"Allowing the individual, rather than the State, to make judgments [about
treatment at the end of life] ... gives proper recognition to the individual's
interest in choosing a final chapter that accords with her life story, rather
than one that demeans her values and poisons memories of her." Id. at 2308(Stevens, J., concurring). He went on to remark, "Encouraging the develop-
ment and ensuring the availability of adequate pain treatment is of utmost
importance." Id.
2. See, e.g., The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to
Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand
1045
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People concerned with the way that individuals meet
death observe that the issue has emerged in the United States
in the 1990s as the post-World War H generation-the baby
boomers-confront the deaths of parents and contemporaries,
and contemplate their own deaths.3 Informed observers suggest
an analogy between the contemporary movement to improve
treatment at the end of life and the movement over the last
three decades to make childbirth more responsive to patients.!
The post-World War II generation, and particularly feminist
women, have transformed medical care in childbirth and other
reproductive health services, moving them from traditions of
physician control to enhanced patient choice.
This Essay explores the analogy between patient control of
birth and reproduction and patient control of death. What can
the movement for patient-centered treatment at the end of life
learn from the earlier movement for patient-centered birth and
control of reproduction? Are birth and death so different that
analogies are limited or irrelevant? Has there really been a
transformative movement toward patient control of childbirth
and other reproductive health services, or is this claim over-
stated?
The subject of patient control over reproduction is vast.
This brief Essay focuses on three issues of control of reproduction
and explores the lessons this recent history offers for patient
control of death. The aspects of reproduction addressed are
childbirth, sterilization, and the education of physicians to per-
form abortions.
I. CHILDBIRTH
In the first half of the twentieth century, the portion of
American babies born in the hospital increased from 10% to
Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT),
274 JAMA 1591, 1595-97 (1995); see also COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF
LIFE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE
END OF LIFE 2, 5-6, 57-58, 126-43, 237-40, 355-56 (Marilyn J. Field & Chris-
tine K. Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT]; NEW
YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH is SOuGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 43-47 (1994);
MARILYN WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH: THE NEW AMERICAN SEARCH TO RESHAPE
THE END OF LIFE 19, 81-125 (1997); Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its
Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592,
594-95 (1994); Kathleen M. Foley, The Treatment of Cancer Pain, 313 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 84,87 (1985).
3. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 4,224,405.
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90%.' At the beginning of the century, women gave birth at
home, attended by a midwife, family members, and neighbors.
Childbirth was often dangerous and painful.6 Both women and
physicians supported the movement to give birth in hospitals,
under medical supervision.7 As childbirth moved to the hospi-
tal, the standard doctor-controlled operating procedures re-
quired that the woman be sedated through labor, the baby be
removed from the unconscious mother by forceps, an incision
(an episiotomy) be made to facilitate use of the forceps, and the
placenta be removed by injecting a drug (ergot).8 Because the
anesthetized woman might thrash about and injure herself,
her arms and legs had to be restrained.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, as the post-World War H gen-
eration began to have babies, they challenged these common
childbirth practices. Their claims, like those of the contempo-
rary movement for compassion in dying, rested on two grounds.
First, many aspects of the physician-controlled childbirth proc-
ess were injurious to women and babies. Second, the standard
operating procedures failed to acknowledge that birth is a social
and spiritual experience, as well as a medical event.
In the 1990s, childbirth in the United States is dramati-
cally different than it was in the 1960s. Childbirth preparation
classes have become common. In some communities, women
can choose to give birth with the help of a midwife, either at
home or at a birthing center.' While most women give birth in
the hospital, that experience has also been transformed. In
most hospitals, for most births, women are free to accept or reject
5. See JUDrTH WALZER LEAvITr, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN
AMERICA, 1730-1950, at 12 (1986).
6. See id. at 13-35.
7. See id. at 196-212.
8. For an early, influential article presaging the increased medical regi-
mentation of childbirth, see Dr. Joseph B. DeLee, The Prophylactic Forceps
Operation, 1 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 34, 34-35 (1920). This trend
continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. "[O]perations research techniques
used to expedite the manufacture of various forms of weaponry in WW H were
applied to developing more effective obstetrical suites.... Priorities were
formulated to facilitate the efficient processing of as many women as possible
rather than to allow for an adjustable tempo for each individual birth."
Roslynn Lindheim, Birthing Centers and Hospices: Reclaiming Birth and
Death, 2 AM. REV. PUB. HEALTH 1 (1981).
9. See Debra Evenson, Midwives: Survival of an Ancient Profession, 7
WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 313, 325 (1983); Kathleen M. Whitby, Comment, Choice
in Childbirth: Parents, Lay Midwives, and Statutory Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 985, 1000 & n.96 (1986).
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pain relief, shaving, enemas, drugs to speed delivery, and other
invasive procedures." Partners and friends can stay with the
woman through labor and delivery. The woman can decide
whether to keep her baby with her after birth or to have him or
her cared for by others."
How did this change occur, and what lessons does it offer
for the contemporary movement for a patient-controlled death?
Some earlier proponents of patient-controlled birth initially
looked to the courts, the Constitution, and the law for help. In
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital," several married couples
who had prepared for childbirth by the LaMaze method chal-
lenged a public hospital policy that barred fathers from the de-
livery room, even though their own doctors supported their
claims. They asserted that the hospital policy denied them a
basic human choice that should be protected by the Constitu-
tion, and there was no medical justification for prohibiting the
fathers' presence and help. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion authored by now Supreme Court Justice
Stevens, rejected their constitutional claim. Overall, the law
has played little role in the transformation of childbirth prac-
tices over the past thirty years, and constitutional law has
played no role. 3
Two factors were most important in transforming child-
birth in America between the 1960s and the 1990s. First,
women became informed and assertive. Second, the hospital
and physician markets responded to women's concerns.
The process by which women became more informed and
assertive in relation to childbirth was multifaceted and com-
10. See Keith P. Russell, The Course and Conduct of Normal Labor and
Delivery, in CURRENT OBSTETRIC & GYNECOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS &
TREATMENT 681, 690, 704 (Ralph C. Bensoned., 5th ed. 1984) (identifying
preparations that "should" be carried out prior to delivery).
1L See Beverly L. Koops & Randall B. Wilkening, The Newborn Infant, in
CURRENT OBSTETRIC & GYNECOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT, supra note
10, at 790, 804-06.
12. 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
13. In a few states, beginning with Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972), courts and legislators adopted a standard of informed con-
sent that focused on the information patients needed to make informed
treatment decisions, rather than on the professional customs of physicians.
However, the changes in the physician-patient relation are much broader than
anything required by a change in the law, and extend to states where the law
has not changed. See JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT
65-71 (1984); SYLVIA A. LAW & STEVE POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS
OF MALPRACTICE 108-14 (1978).
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plex. One important development was the publication of Our
Bodies, Ourselves. Authored by the Boston Women's Health
Collective, the book was first published in 1969, on newspaper
stock, without any claim to copyright. New editions were pub-
lished in 1973, 1984, and 1992.4 The book was the product of a
movement concerned with the whole range of issues that affect
women's health. By 1997, the book had sold over four million
copies in fifteen languages." The book, "branded and banned
as radical early on, has become mainstream.""
The book remains popular because it taps into historical
and social movements and responds to a broad range of con-
cerns of women in many different circumstances. For example,
in relation to childbirth, it offers both social history and con-
crete medical, technical information. It supports women who
choose home birth and advises those who give birth in high-
tech teaching hospitals about what to expect and how to
maximize patient control. It helps women to engage in dia-
logue with doctors and to select doctors and hospitals on a
more informed basis. The movement toward informed, woman-
controlled childbirth is dominated by educated middle-class
women. But the changes in hospital and physician practices
that it has generated have cut across class lines, at least to
some degree. 7
Informed patients, concerned about exercising control over
their childbirth experience, found a market eager to meet their
needs. Delivering babies for healthy, insured women is finan-
cially attractive to doctors and hospitals."
How does this experience in the transformation of child-
birth illuminate the current effort to transform the choices con-
fronting dying patients? People confronting death have no re-
source comparable to Our Bodies, Ourselves. Derek Humphrey's
14. See BOSTON WOMEN's HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIvE, THE NEw OURBODIES, OURSELVES: A BOOK BYAND FOR WOMEN (25th anniversary ed. 1992)
[hereinafter OUR BODIES, OURSELVES].
15. See Sara Rimer, They Talked and Talked, and Then Wrote a Classic,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at 27.
16. Id.
17. See LEAVITT, supra note 5, at 213-18.
18. See Elisabeth R. Sullivan, Hospitals Wooing Parents-to.Be: New Serv-
ices, Facilities Offered to Obtain Lifetime Affiliations, PHILADELPHIA IN.QUIRER, July 6, 1988, at B1. Indeed even when women are insured through
Medicaid, hospitals compete fiercely to deliver their babies. See Tamar Lewin,
Hospitals Serving the Poor Struggle to Retain Patients: Private Centers Lure
Away Medicaid Recipients, N.Y. TImES, Sept. 3, 1997, at Al.
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best selling how-to book, Final Exit, addresses one important
issue, suicide. 9 Marilyn Webb's magnificent book, The Good
Death, provides a powerful description of recent developments
in relation to death. A growing number of works address par-
ticular aspects of pain and dying.' Support groups for people
confronting particular illnesses proliferate.2'
But there is no resource book on death, similar to Our Bodies,
Ourselves. There is no book on dying that reflects a social
movement, responds to changing circumstances, recognizes
that the core issue is one of patient choice and respects the fact
that people have divergent values. A comparable book about
death and dying would be tremendously useful.
Even if the social movement of people concerned about
death could generate a community of concern that could sup-
port a resource comparable to Our Bodies, Ourselves, it is not
clear that the two situations, birth and death, are comparable.
Childbirth provides a unique opportunity for planned patient
choice. Many people plan their pregnancies. The nine months
of gestation provide a neatly defined time for education, shop-
ping, and choice. The birth of a child is often a desired, joyous
experience. Ordinary people can make choices about birth
precisely because it is, in most cases, a largely predictable and
"healthy" process. By contrast, death, even if it is experienced
as well as possible, is a profound loss. Death is messier, less
predictable, and more complex than birth. It is not clear that
people concerned about death constitute a social movement and
community that is comparable to that supporting Our Bodies,
Ourselves.'
19. See DEREK HUMPHREY, FINAL EXIT (1991). The book, written by the
founder of the Hemlock Society, provides detailed information about how to
commit suicide. Within a week it rose to the top of the New York Times best
seller list for how-to books. Humphrey commented that the success of the
book "legitimized everything by making money." Andrew Solomon, A Death of
One's Own, NEWYORKER, May 22, 1995, at 54, 59.
20. See, e.g., DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE OF PAIN (1991) (discussing
the process of death with special concern for pain); SHERWIN NULAND, How
WE DIE (1994) (describing and attempting to de-mythologize the process of
dying); ELIsABETH KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969) (discussing
the emotional aspects of death); PATRICIA WEENOLSEN, THE ART OF DYING
(1996) (same).
21. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 206-07.
22. The movement concerned with death does, however, command finan-
cial and professional resources that have never been available to the move-
ment for women-centered childbirth. See id. at 339-400.
[Vol. 82:10451050
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Further, it is not clear that the market will be as respon-
sive to the needs of dying people as it has been to the needs of
women giving birth. Childbirth is cheap, especially when all
goes well.' Death is expensive, particularly when well-
supported. 4 Thus, many reasons suggest that it will be diffi-
cult to use the movement toward patient-controlled childbirth
as a helpful model for patient-controlled death.
Further, patient-controlled childbirth, far from being a
model, is rare. Most pregnant women must choose between ac-
cess to technology and control of birth. A few programs in a
few cities offer women control of the birth process, with easy
access to high-tech services if they become necessary.' But
most women must choose. If a woman chooses home birth or
hospital birth in a small local community, she will not have
easy access to technology if problems develop.' If, on the other
hand, she chooses to give birth at a high-tech hospital she will
be required to accept the current version of standard operating
procedures.27
Similar choices confront dying people. Hospice is the
death equivalent of home birth. Hospice programs help pa-
tients to control pain and physical symptoms and to address
personal and spiritual aspects of death. But to enter most
hospice programs the patient, and his or her physician, must
forsake efforts at cure." Medicare will fund hospice care only if
23. See OURBODIEs, OURsELvEs, supra note 14, at 435-40.
24 See WEBB, supra note 2, at 209; see also infra notes 28-30 and accom-
panying text (discussing the costs of hospice care).
25. See, e.g., BARBARA BRENNAN & JOAN R. HEmLmAN, THE COMPLETE
BOOK OF MIDWIFERY 14-15, 50-51 (1977).
26. Dr. David Hilfiker describes a "wonderfully normal" childbirth gone
wrong in a small hospital without resources. See DAvID HLFIKER, HEALING
THE WOUNDS 4547 (1985).
27. See generally David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, The Risks and
Benefits of Episiotomy: A Review, 9 BIRTH 25, 29 (1982) (noting that
episiotomies are routinely required even though evidence does not support
their benefit); David A. Luthy et al., A Randomized Trial of Electronic Fetal
Monitoring in Preterm Labor, in 69 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 687, 694
(1987) (noting that even though electronic fetal monitoring is routinely re-
quired, studies have not demonstrated any benefit from the procedure); Kirk-
wood K. Shy et al., Effects of Electronic Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring, Com-
pared with Periodic Ausculation, on the Neurologic Development of Premature
Infants, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 588, 591 (1990) (finding that electronic fetal
monitoring does not produce benefits, at least with regard to mitigation of
neurological disorders, even though it is commonly required).
28. See Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the 'Terminally Ill": Insights from
SUPPORT, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 311, 312 (1996) (noting that only 15% of patients
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a physician certifies that a patient is likely to die within six
months.29 Additionally, to qualify for most hospice care pro-
grams, a dying individual must have another person willing to
serve as his or her primary caretaker, a home in which he or
she can die peacefully, and an environment that is sufficiently
stable into which to bring opiate drugs.
Rational, professional, and financial considerations sup-
port policies that require people to make these choices in rela-
tion to birth and death. In relation to birth, medical profes-
sionals honestly believe that a closely monitored birth in a
technically sophisticated setting is better for mothers and in-
fants.31 Because they believe this, responsible doctors and hos-
pitals are reluctant to support alternative forms of childbirth.
In relation to death, the reasons for requiring people to
choose between hospice care and curative treatment are some-
what different. A central element of the hospice care philoso-
phy is an acceptance of the fact that a person is dying.32 Fur-
ther, most hospice care involves nontechnological caring
services. The United States is extremely reluctant to fund
nontechnological caring services.33 Vulnerable people-infants,
the dying, people with disabilities-have significant needs for
caring help. Those needs have traditionally been met by fami-
lies, without compensation.34
receiving hospice care are alive after six months and the median survival in
hospice care is only thirty-six days).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd) (West Supp. 1997); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 30, 168-69.
30. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31; WEBB, SU-
pra note 2, at 213.
31. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists considers
home birth tantamount to child abuse; some hospitals will withdraw staff
privileges from doctors who help women to give birth at home. See George J.
Annas, Home Birth: Autonomy v. Safety, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1978,
at 19, 19.
32. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 102-05.
33. For example, Medicare covers home health care services only if they
are needed on an intermittent or part-time basis, provided under the direction
of a physician. See 42 C.F.R. § 409.40 (1997). Housekeeping and transporta-
tion services are not covered. See id. § 409.41. The costs of Medicare's home
health care benefit has grown rapidly in the 1990s. See INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 171-72.
34. More precisely, these caring needs have been met by the unpaid work
of women in the home. See Chai R. Feldblum, Home Health Care for the Eld-
erly: Programs, Problems, and Potentials, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 193 (1985);
Sylvia A. Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 YALE L.J. 1769,
1780-86 (1986) (discussing political perspectives on the care of the frail eld-
erly).
[Vol. 82:10451052
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Thus, hospice follows a strong American tradition. Ordi-
nary needs should be met by families. The community should
assure access to extraordinary needs for life-saving medical
care.35 But the line between serious medical care and support
for the activities of daily living must be seriously policed.
Forcing patients to choose between technology and cure, on
the one hand, or patient-centered comfort care, on the other, is
not inevitable or wise for either birth or death. It is possible to
have both. But we have a deep cultural tradition, in relation to
both birth and death, of forcing people to choose.
II. STERILIZATION
Recent decades have seen a similar movement from doctor
control to patient choice in relation to sterilization. For most of
the twentieth century in the United States, sterilization was
completely controlled by doctors and the state. For some people-
criminals, the retarded, and the poor-sterilization was re-
quired.36 For others, sterilization was prohibited. Until the
35. See, e.g., The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). The Act requires all hospitals to provide
emergency care and treatment for women in active labor. See id. § 1395dd(e);
cf. Power v. Arlington Hosp., 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing that
Congress enacted this statute to respond to incidents of "patient dumping"
when hospitals would refuse to treat patients who could not pay or would
transfer them before their conditions had stabilized).
36. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (approving state-mandated
sterilization of a women alleged to be retarded). Ironically, the woman at the
center of this historic case, Carrie Buck, was not retarded. See Paul H. Lom-
bardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 30, 52 (1985). Reflection on the Nazi experience in World War H1 ul-
timately made state-mandated sterilization socially unacceptable. See, e.g.,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (striking down a state pro-
gram that required sterilization of recidivist criminals except those convicted
of white-collar crimes).
In recent decades sterilization has been required by doctors, rather than
the state. See, e.g., Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978). Dr. Pierce, an obstetrician practicing in a small
community, refused to deliver babies for poor women who had two children
unless they "agreed7 to be sterilized. Id. at 611. The court found "no reason
why Dr. Pierce could not establish and pursue the policy he has publicly and
freely announced." Id. at 613.
Unlike some of his colleagues, Dr. Pierce announced his policy in advance.
More common is the practice of asking women to consent to sterilization dur-
ing labor. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), va-
cated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In response to this suit, federal regula-
tions require informed consent that must be obtained if a sterilization is to be
financed by Medicaid. These regulations mandate a 72-hour waiting period
between the time of consent and the operation and prohibit sterilization of
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1970s, professional organizations and hospital policies enforced
"The Rule of 120" that prohibited sterilization unless the pa-
tient's age, multiplied by her number of living children,
equaled 120."7
By the 1990s, legal and professional attitudes toward
sterilization had been transformed. Now, sterilization is per-
ceived as a matter of patient choice, rather than professional or
state control. The Rule of 120 has been abandoned and sterili-
zation has become the most common form of contraception in
the United States.38 Mandated sterilization is no longer so-
cially or legally acceptable.3"
As a formal matter, in the past three decades, legal and
professional attitudes toward sterilization have changed from
an assumption of doctor control to one of patient choice. De-
spite this change in the formal norms, it may well be the case
that women, particularly poor women and women of color, are
still sterilized without true consent.' In the late 1970s, when
Ralph Nader and various women's health organizations monitored
women under age 21. See Voe v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Conn. 1977)
(upholding the constitutionality of the minors provision); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201-
50.206 (1997).
37. See William D. Mosher & Christine A. Bachrach, Understanding U.S.
Fertility: Continuity and Change in the National Survey of Family Growth,
1988-1995,28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4,6 (1996).
38. See id.
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also In re Lacey P., 433
S.E.2d 518 (W. Va. 1993). The trial court ordered a mother, whose parental
rights had been terminated because she neglected her children, to be sterilized.
See id. at 521. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the case was moot
because the mother had Norplant implanted. See id. at 524. The state su-
preme court implied in dicta that the original holding would have been inva-
lid. See id. at 525.
Later disputes about mandatory sterilization have often involved re-
tarded people. Many states authorize sterilization of sexually active retarded
people. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Caro-
lina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976). Some states allow retarded people to
be sterilized if sterilization would be in the patientfs best interest and the pa-
tient can provide some form of informed consent. See, e.g., In re Guardianship
of Hays, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980). Yet other judges are skeptical whether
sterilization is ever appropriate for retarded people. See, e.g., In re Valerie N.,
707 P.2d 760, 782 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
40. Sterilization is the most commonly used form of contraception in the
United States. See Mosher & Bachrach, supra note 37, at 6. Low-income
women, those with little education, and Hispanics and blacks are most likely
to be sterilized. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL POLITIcs:
WOMEN, STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 134 (1985); see also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1442-43
(1993).
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compliance with sterilization consent requirements, they found
that violations were common.4' In the 1990s, few public or pri-
vate organizations monitor for sterilization abuse.
In the 1990s, access to pain-relief medication is similar to
sterilization in the 1970s, in that doctors are in control. As
with sterilization in the 1970s, doctor control raises two prob-
lems. First, many terminally ill patients are denied the pain
relief that they want. Second, some patients may be provided
"terminal sedation" even though they have not sought it.
Undertreatment of pain is probably the more serious
problem.42 For example, doctors at Memorial Sloan-Kettering,
perhaps the most advanced hospital center for the treatment of
cancer and of dying patients in the United States, assert that,
"[u]nder informed consent and medical self-determination, it is
a patient's legal right to reject sedation for symptom control if
it is offered but it is not something patients can demand from a
doctor."4" Patients can reject treatments, even if death is a cer-
tain consequence." But they cannot demand pain control even
if they are dying. The doctor is in charge.
Doctors and other health care professionals systematically
undertreat pain.4 Palliative care is not a recognized specialty
in U.S. medical education, as it is in many European countries,
and doctors are not routinely well trained in palliative care.'
Effective treatment of pain is a necessary pre-condition to the
dying patient's ability to deal with the personal and spiritual
aspects of death.47
The law reinforces physicians' professional inclinations to
undertreat pain. When doctors prescribe narcotics, often the
most effective pain medication, they must fill out special triplicate
forms and submit a copy to the state. The triplicate form re-
quirements have a significant impact discouraging doctors from
prescribing sufficient drugs to control the pain of terminally ill
41. See Sylvia A. Law, Sterilization Comes Easier for the Disadvantaged,
23 N.Y.U. L. CENTER BULL. 15, 17 (1977).
42. See studies cited supra note 2.
43. WEBB, supra note 2, at 119.
44 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978).
45. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131-32.
46. See id. at 113, 209, 212, 216, 218-27, 328-31, 338-53; WEBB, supra
note 2, at 77, 88.
47. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 227.
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people." In 1977, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected an ar-
gument that New York's version of this law violated the privacy
rights of patients who feared that the information might be-
come public. 9 The claim presented was an extremely broad
and abstract challenge to the constitutionality of the statute on
its face. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of any risk that confi-
dential information would be improperly revealed.' The state,
by contrast, presented strong evidence of diligence in preserv-
ing the confidentiality of the information contained in the
forms." Plaintiffs did not allege, and the Court did not con-
sider, any claim that the triplicate form requirement would
prevent patients from receiving medication for pain. In light of
the Supreme Court's 1997 assumption that patients have a
right to pain medication, and the overwhelming evidence that
the triplicate form requirement deters doctors from providing
necessary pain relief, the constitutionality of the triplicate form
requirement should be challenged, and the Court should rec-
ognize that it imposes an unconstitutional burden on access to
care at the end of life.
State medical boards investigate and discipline doctors
who overprescribe pain medication.' For example, in 1987, Dr.
Ronald Blum, a Professor of Oncology at NYU Medical School
and Deputy Director of the Kaplan Cancer Center, was working
with doctors from Memorial Sloan-Kettering on a clinical trial
of a new form of pain medication. Officials from the State
Health Department came to his office, flashed badges and
guns, and gave him Miranda warnings. He was charged with
the criminal offense of failing to retain all of his triplicate form
records for the preceding five years and failing to report some
of his terminally ill cancer patients as habitual drug users or
addicts. Dr. Blum hired a criminal defense lawyer and the
case was eventually dismissed.' No doctor is ever disciplined
for failure to treat pain.' Under federal law it is a crime for
48. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 227.
49. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
50. See id. at 601.
51. See id. at 602.
52. See INSTITUE OF MEDIcINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 194-95 (citing
David E. Joranson, State Medical Board Guidelines for Treatment of Intracta-
ble Pain, AM. PAIN Soc'Y BULL., May/June 1995, at 1).
53. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 92-93.
54. One case, Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., Super Ct. Div.
89CVS 64 (Hertford Cty., N.C. Nov. 20, 1990), held a nursing home liable for
failing to administer the pain medication that the physician had ordered.
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anyone other than a doctor to sell a Schedule H drug, which
includes most effective forms of pain relief." Pharmacists face
incentives similar to those that confront doctors. To avoid
risks of professional discipline and criminal prosecution, many
pharmacists simply do not stock narcotic pain medications."
Both physician attitudes and the law make it particularly
difficult for people who have used narcotic drugs to obtain ade-
quate pain relief. The common assumption is that if a person
has a history of using illegal drugs for recreational purposes,
he or she is not entitled to pain relief when terminally ill.'
Even if we accept the legitimacy of public policy that makes
some drugs illegal for recreational purposes, and recognize the
difficulty of enforcing this public policy, it seems cruel to deny
pain relief to terminally ill patients on that basis.
While undertreatment of pain is the most serious problem
confronting terminally ill patients, as with sterilization, there
may also be a problem in relation to doctors who provide ter-
minal sedation to patients who would choose to endure pain
and struggle to live. In 1988, the Journal of the American
Medical Association published an anonymous article by a gyne-
cological resident in which he described giving a lethal injection to
a twenty-year-old woman named Debbie, who was dying of
ovarian cancer. He was called to her bedside in the middle of
However, that is quite different from holding a doctor liable for failing to pre-
scribe adequate pain medication. Ordinary malpractice standards require a
plaintiff to show that a doctor's failure to conform to professional standards
caused injury. Given that common professional standards systematically un-
dertreat pain in terminally ill patients, it is difficult to establish that doctors
who undertreat have violated professional standards. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text (noting that many patients suffer from untreated pain).
See generally Kathryn L. Tucker, Surrogate End of Life Decisionmaking: The
Importance of Providing Procedural Due Process, A Case Review, 72 WAsH. L.
REV. 859 (1997) (exploring a doctor's professional duty to treat pain).
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2) (1994) (definition); id. §§ 829(a), 841(a)
(criminal prohibitions). Under federal law, Schedule I drugs are deemed so
dangerous and inappropriate that it is crime to use or sell them even for
medical purposes, under physician supervision. Schedule I drugs include
heroin, LSD and marijuana. In 1996, Arizona and California approved the
medical use of marijuana. It appears that these state initiatives violate fed-
eral law. Federal officials recognize that the most likely means of enforcing
the federal ban against medical marijuana is discipline of physicians by state
medical boards. See Prescription for Addiction? The Arizona and California
Medical Drug Use Initiatives: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of
the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 71 (1996).
56. See WEBB, supra note 2, at 19, 98.
57. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 195-96.
58. See Anonymous, It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
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the night because she was in great pain. 9 He had never before
met the patient.' She said, "Let's get this over with."' The
resident administered a lethal injection. 2 The Journal received
over 150 letters in response to the column.' Approximately
80% of the respondents opposed the actions of the physician
and 75% believed that the Journal should not have published
the piece.' The concerns expressed in the letters included the
fact that the doctor did not know the patient, the patient may
not have felt the same way the next morning, and the doctor
had not done all that was possible to deal with her symptoms."5
The Supreme Court's 1997 decision, affirming patients'
right to pain treatment at the end of life, pays little attention
to the issue of patient consent and control. The plaintiffs, who
challenged criminal prohibitions against physician-assisted
suicide, gave careful, conservative attention to the matter of
patient choice. Compassion in Dying has developed a complex
process to assure authentic, informed, voluntary patient choice.
Kathryn L. Tucker, the principal lawyer representing the dying
patients who sought physician help in dying, has also repre-
sented patients who resisted doctor and hospital efforts to
terminate life support." The Supreme Court's easy assumption
that pain relief is available6 7 is empirically wrong.68 Further, it
wholly fails to address the problems of protecting patient
choice.69
59. See id. at 272.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See George D. Lundberg, "It's Over, Debbie" and the Euthanasia De-
bate, 259 JAMA 2142, 2142 (1988).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Letters, "It's Over, Debbie", 259 JAMA 2094-98 (1988).
66. See Tucker, supra note 54, at 861. Physicians sought to withdraw
treatment without first learning the patient's wishes. Even though the pa-
tient's ability to communicate was limited, had the doctors sought his views,
they would have learned that he wished to continue treatment. See id. The
doctors' decision to withdraw treatment was reversed by the aggressive action
of the patient's former wife, who obtained a court order to resume life support.
See id.
67. See supra note 1 (discussing pain relief options available to patients
in Washington and New York).
68. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (examining the reality of
pain relief options available to dying patients).
69. See David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide but Embracing Euthanasia, 337 NEW ENG.
J. MIED. 1236, 1238 (1997).
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In short, the movement for a patient-controlled death has
much to learn from the movement from doctor control to pa-
tient choice in relation to sterilization. Both professional stan-
dards and the law can make a difference. Medical licensing
boards, for both physicians and pharmacists, could do much to
assure doctors that they will not be disciplined for providing
adequate pain medication for terminally ill patients. Indeed,
these boards could take a leadership role in imposing sanctions
on doctors and pharmacists who make it unreasonably difficult
for terminally ill patients to obtain pain relief. At the same
time, professional ethics and medical education should do more
to make plain to doctors that terminally ill patients retain, to
the extent possible, the right to reject terminal sedation. At
the same time, our experience in relation to both childbirth and
sterilization suggests that changes in the law, while sometimes
necessary, are not sufficient to modify traditional physician
attitudes and established patterns of patient-physician rela-
tionships. In addition, a move toward greater patient control
requires that patients be educated and supported in seeking
greater control of their bodies and lives.
III. MEDICAL EDUCATION, PAIN AND ABORTION
A growing consensus recognizes that medical education
fails to train doctors to provide competent care to dying pa-
tients." "Deficiencies in undergraduate, graduate, and con-
tinuing education for end-of-life care reflect a medical culture
that defines death as failure and ignores care for dying people
as a source of professional accomplishment and personal
meaning."7
Medical education has similarly failed to train doctors to
perform abortions. Even though abortion is the most common
surgical procedure in the United States,' in 84% of the coun-
ties in the United States no doctor openly provides them.'
Medical schools do not train doctors to perform abortions; indeed,
47% of residents specializing in obstetrics and gynecology re-
ported that at the end of four years of specialized training they
70. See INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 207-34; WEBB,
supra note 2, at 42-48.
71. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 207.
72. See FREDERICK S. JAFFE ET AL., ABORTION POLITICs: PRIVATE
MORALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1981).
73. See Stanley K Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in
the United States, 1991 and 1992,26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 100 (1994).
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had acquired no experience in performing first trimester abor-
tions.74 In 1993, medical students, concerned about this failure,
organized to encourage their schools and training programs to
provide education on abortion."' In 1995, the Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) promul-
gated standards requiring that medical education programs
provide training in abortion. Programs that oppose abortion on
moral or religious grounds could meet the obligations by ar-
ranging training at another institution for students who do not
share those religious concerns. In response to strong political
opposition, the standards were substantially relaxed during
1995. The impact of this new policy remains to be seen. 6
Many of the same factors discourage medical education
from providing adequate training to enable doctors to provide
competent care to people who are dying and to people who seek
abortions. In both cases, the services required are often low-
tech and non-heroic. In both cases, there are significant
strains of moral opposition to meeting patient needs. Insofar
as medical education is based primarily in acute care hospitals,
it is challenging to provide education for services that are typi-
cally provided on an outpatient basis.
On the other hand, several factors suggest that it might
prove to be easier to transform medical education to train doctors
to provide competent care for dying patients than to assure
that doctors are trained to provide abortion. Most importantly,
death comes to everyone, while abortions are needed only by
sexually active women. Over the past few years, large amounts
of private funds and professional resources have been invested
to study and improve the care of dying patients.' There has
74. See Carolyn Westhoff et aL, Residency Training in Contraception, Ster-
ilization and Abortion, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 311, 312 tbL3 (1993).
The proportion of obstetrics and gynecology residency programs providing rou-
tine training in first trimester abortions decreased from 23% in 1985 to 12% in
1992, and the proportion providing routine training in second trimester abor-
tions declined from 21% to 7%. See H. Trent MacKay & Andrea P. MacKay,
Abortion Training in Obstetrics and Gynecology Residency Programs in the
United States, 1991-1992, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 112, 112-14 & 113 tbL1 (1995).
75. See Susan Gilbert, Clinic Violence Sets Off Push for Wider Abortion
Training, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1995, at Cll.
76. The various versions of the ACGME policy on abortion training are
set forth in RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 1325-26 (1997).
77. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supra note 2, at 1591; IN-
STITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 327-57; WEBB, supra note 2, at
399-400.
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been no comparable investment of money or professional re-
sources to encourage the education of doctors to provide abor-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important lesson that the movement to-
ward patient-controlled reproduction has to offer those con-
cerned about patient control of death is the importance of in-
formed patient planning. Even though psychological and
practical factors make planning for death much more difficult
than planning for birth, much more could be done to provide
dying patients and their families the information that they
need to make informed choices and to act upon them.
Further, our experience in relation to sterilization for
people who seek it suggests that changes in professional atti-
tudes can have an important impact. So too in relation to pa-
tient-controlled death, changes in professional norms could be
important. Our experience in relation to involuntary steriliza-
tion, by contrast, suggests that the law can have a major effect
in changing formal state policy, but a more modest impact in
affecting professional behavior.
Our experience in relation to medical education and abor-
tion is perhaps most sobering. Even though a very broad con-
sensus of the medical profession has recognized that there is a
pressing need to do a better job to train doctors to provide
abortions, and referrals for abortion, change has been very
slow in coming. Abortion, of course, raises different moral and
political issues than does patient-controlled death.
For almost three decades, millions of patients and physi-
cians have grappled with the issues of patient control in the
context of reproductive health services. While there have been
great transformations, serious problems persist. As the culture
now turns attention to these issues in the context of pain and
death, we can learn much from this earlier experience. One
core lesson of history is that change is slow and difficult.

